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Abstract 
The paper puts the collapse of the world trade volume in 2009 into two 
historic perspectives. First, the paper analyses 18 major post-1980/pre-2007 
financial crises and uses these observations as a basis to critically evaluate 
presently available projections for world trade. Second, the paper takes into 
account the developments in the world's trade volume and openness since 
1880. Next to the direct impact of the present financial crisis on trade, 
potential second order effects on economic growth and international political 
relations are identified. 
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Some Economic Historic Perspectives On The 2009 
World Trade Collapse1 
1 Introduction 
In March 2009, in preparation for the April G20 meeting, the World Bank 
(2009a), the World Trade Organization (2009) and the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (2009a) published projections for 
the development of global trade. The forecasts agreed that world trade in 2009 
would contract although the studies disagreed on the actual rate of decrease of 
the volume of world trade (see Table 1). The predictions of the international 
organizations also agreed in the sense that they foresaw that trade would hit 
bottom soon and that positive growth would return on average in 2010. In this 
sense their predictions were both dismal and optimistic at the same time. It is 
not clear, however, why the predictions differed by so much (estimates range 
from –6.1 to –13.2 per cent) and how the duration of trade reduction has been 
established since the institutions have not provided detailed information about 
the actual models and assumptions. Since the April G20 meeting the global 
trade projections showed the usual pattern of continuous and substantial 
downward revision (see Fingerand and Schuknecht 1999, pp. 25-6)2  
TABLE 1 
Recent predictions for world trade 
 2009 2010 
 March ‘09 estimate 
July ‘09 
estimate  
World Bank –6,1% –9.7% 2,3% 
WTO –9% –10% “recovery” 
OECD –13,2% –16% 1,5% 
Sources: World Bank 2009 a,b, World Trade Organization 2009a,b  and OECD 2009a, b 
 
                                                 
1 Peter A.G. van Bergeijk is Professor of International Economics and 
Macroeconomics at the Institute of Social Studies/Erasmus University and deputy 
director of CERES, Research School for Resource Studies for Development, Utrecht. 
Email: bergeijk@iss.nl. A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Dutch as 
P.A.G. van Bergeijk, ‘Diepte en duur van de invoerkrimp’ ESB 94 (4559), May 1 2009, 
pp. 269-70. 
2 Trade estimates had been revised substantially downward by the end of the second 
quarter of 2009. The central scenario in World Bank (2009b, p. 9) amounts to a 
reduction in the volume of trade with –9.7 %; the protracted recession scenario 
(World Bank 2009b, p. 33) includes shrinkage of –11.9% in 2009 and, additionally, a  
–4.7% in 2010. The OECD (2009b) p. 39 revised downward its negative growth 
estimate for world trade in 2009 to –16%. WTO (2009b). 
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This working paper uses an approach that provides an alternative for the 
modelling exercises that are typically used by the large international 
organizations. Recently, a number of papers have taken an historical approach 
focusing on the development of key economic factors in the aftermath of 
financial crises. Examples are Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009). These contributions focus on the development during and after 
a financial crisis of specific financial and economic variables regarding the 
national economies that are being studied. Typically movements in asset prices, 
credit, unemployment and Gross Domestic Product are reported. Hardly any 
attention, however, has been paid to the development of international trade. 
When trade is part of the analysis, the dataset is regionally focused (Hong et al. 
2009) or deals with a subset of countries such as the OECD (Claessens et al. 
2008) or emerging markets (Thomas 2009). Clearly, a broader perspective is in 
order if one wants to assess the extent and possible duration of the trade 
collapse that is induced by the present credit crisis. This would seem to be 
especially relevant because, according to Thomas (2009, p. 2), ‘the economic 
literature on the linkages between trade volumes and financing is very thin’.   
This paper attempts to fill this gap. Section 2 discusses how financial crises 
may influence exports and imports. Section 3 summarizes historical evidence 
on the impact and duration of import volume reductions in the context of 
individual financial crises, in particular in the post-1980/pre-2007 era. This 
approach is relevant in the present context because a global reduction in 
import demand will by definition enforce a decrease of exports for all 
countries. In section 4 we will therefore look beyond these individual crises 
and also reflect on some issues posed by the previous global trade collapse that 
occurred in the 1930s. Section 5 deals with second order effects of the 2009 
trade collapse, in terms of both potential growth reducing and political 
implications. The final section concludes and discusses some policy relevant 
issues. 
2 Why Import Rather Than Export Is Key To 
Understanding The Trade Collapse 
The reason for the neglect of trade in most analyses of the aftermath of 
financial crises may very well be that the impact of a crisis on exports is 
ambiguous. The decline in domestic demand may induce firms to find new 
markets abroad and if policy makers respond with a devaluation one expects 
that exports will increase in the aftermath of a financial crisis (Fingerand and 
Schuknecht, 1999, p. 24). More importantly, individual country experiences 
during such episodes typically show that policy makers opt for an export led 
growth strategy to get out of the crisis situation. Resources are often re-
allocated towards the export sector in order to ensure that hard currency can 
be earned, for example, in order to be able to meet international debt 
obligations. Exports thus actually may tend to grow during and after financial 
crises. Given this theoretical ambiguity it is not surprising that the empirical 
evidence regarding the impact of financial crises on export growth is mixed. 
One of the leading studies in the field (Claessens et al. 2009, Tables 6, 7, 8, 9 
and 11, pp. 66–70) generally reports insignificant coefficients. It is only in the 
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sub-sample of those recessions that include house price bursts that a positive 
impact on the volume of exports is significant (but only at the 90% confidence 
level). Thomas (2009, p. 7) reports a negative contemporaneous banking crisis 
dummy (also only at the 90% confidence level) for the exports of emerging 
markets that are hit by a financial crises. Hong et al. (2009, Figure 3, p. 14) 
graphically report an average slowdown of export growth, but the mean and 
median response in their sample never turns negative. The evidence all in all is 
inconclusive, which seems to imply that export is not strongly impacted during 
a financial crisis. Indeed, the IMF (2009, p. 112) notes that   
one key factor that helped economies recover from a recession associated with a 
financial crisis was the fact that they were able to benefit from strong external 
demand. This suggests that disruptions to the supply of credit may not matter 
much for firms that are highly dependent on outside funding if they produce 
goods that are highly tradable 
This stylized fact, however, should not lead to the erroneous conclusion that 
finance is not important for international trade. On the contrary, the disruption 
of credit a priori would seem to be very relevant for international trade, be it for 
import flows or for export flows. Banks and banking services are more (and 
often much more) important for international activities than for domestic 
activities (cf. Fingerand and Schuknecht, 1999 and Auboin and Meier-Ewert, 
2003). First, the working capital is ceteris paribus needed for a substantially 
longer period in international transactions because of the time involved in 
transportation over much longer distances. Second, international payment is 
much more complicated because of different exchange rates and different 
jurisdictions. Third, in contrast to domestic trade, payment in cash is not a 
viable alternative so that banks always need to be involved. It is not only the 
fact that international trade crucially depends on financial services to finance 
trade-related expenditure and to insure against trade-related risk that makes 
trade vulnerable for financial instability. Equally important is that actual 
payments need to be settled by involving several banks that function under 
different regulatory supervision regimes so that thrust between the financial 
institutions involved is a sine qua non. During financial crises thrust collapses 
and thus trade is at risk. 
 From a political economy perspective the perception may be relevant 
that imports entail an outflow of hard currency. Thus policy makers might not 
be inclined to come to the aid of importing firms (unless the imports are 
crucial for the exporting industry). Payment risk is especially relevant for the 
importer who will experience a rise in transaction costs, for example, because 
letters of credit or even full payment in advance is required. The reduction in 
effective demand that is a consequence of a financial crisis directly translates 
into a reduced import volume. Finally, in a scenario that involves a 
depreciation of the currency the price of imports will rise and thus exert a 
negative influence on the volume of imports.  
All in all the impact of a financial crisis should be expected to be most 
visible and unambiguous in the development of the volume of imports and this 
is the issue of the next section. 
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3 A Short History Of  Financial Crises And Import 
Crunches 
Figure 1 summarizes the depth (percentage decrease) and duration (quarters) 
of the reduction of imports. These variables are measured from peak (i.e. the 
turning point where the rate of growth of imports becomes negative) to trough 
(i.e. the end of the contraction of the import volume where the rate of growth 
becomes positive again). Figure 1 deals with the aftermath of 18 important 
financial crises that were identified in Fingerand and Schuknecht (1999) and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). These crises occurred after 1980 and before 2007, 
the year that the present credit crisis set in.  
 
FIGURE 1 
 Import volume during 18 major post 1980 financial crises 
Decrease in per cent and duration in quarters (both peak to trough) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: see the data appendix 
 
The sample of 18 crises is more balanced than other studies in the field in the 
sense that this group of countries covers most continents and includes 
countries with rather different levels of development, but the sample is also 
biased because relative small financial crises are not included and because a 
lack of reliable data prohibited the inclusion of all crises studied in Fingerand 
and Schuknecht (1999) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Moreover, the 
comparability of the data is imperfect since different sources had to be 
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consulted so that the real reductions in the volume of imports are based on 
different methodologies. Only in a limited number of cases the preferred data 
(import volumes deflated by relevant international price indices) were available 
from the IMF. So other methods had to be used as well, for example, National 
Accounts data which are available from the OECD or the IMF and which are 
deflated by import price indices (that are established on a national basis) or by 
the GDP deflator. The appendix discusses the sources and methods that have 
been used for individual countries. 
Most importantly, in a number of cases that are identified by Fingerand 
and Schuknecht (1999) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) no reliable data on the 
volume of imports were available at all so that these financial crises were 
excluded from the sample. The imperfectness of the data is a problem that, 
unfortunately, cannot be solved if one wants to broaden the perspective and 
thus has to study a group of heterogeneous countries as in the present working 
paper. Clearly the results in this working paper thus need to be interpreted with 
caution. 
With this caveat in mind it is noteworthy that the volume of imports on 
average decreased by 25.4 percent (with a standard deviation of 13.4) during 
4.8 quarters (with a standard deviation of 2.6). The empirical evidence 
summarized in Figure 1 can be compared to findings of Claessens et al (2008, 
pp. 66–70) who, depending of the type of the crisis that is being studied, report 
for their sample of 122 recessions in 21 OECD countries in the years 1960–
2007 that median and mean decreases in import volumes occur in the range of 
–5 to –8 per cent at a confidence level of 99%. The smaller amplitude for 
OECD countries is in line with the fact that generally speaking the largest 
impacts according to Figure 1 are found in non OECD countries. 
From the perspective of Figure 1, the forecasts by the international 
organizations (summarized in Table 1) are probably too optimistic (even after 
the second quarter revisions of the projections) regarding the expected 
percentage decrease although the relative quick rebound of world trade appears 
in line with the individual country experiences.  
It should, however, be noted that peak-to-trough developments may 
provide a distorted and a too optimistic picture of the actual duration of the 
problems. Consider, for example, Table 2 that provides further information on 
the time that elapses until the import volume has completely returned to its 
pre-crisis level. Recovery to pre-crisis levels on average takes 13.1 quarters 
(with a standard deviation of 7.6). Often the cases appear to be of a long and 
protracted nature. Moreover, a key question is whether these individual cases 
can be relied upon in view of the seriousness and global nature of the present 
crisis. This is not obvious as I will argue in the next section. 
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TABLE 2 
 Duration of the import crunch and its recovery 
 Year Period (Quarters)  
 
 Peak 
 to trough 
(1) 
Recovery to 
pre-crisis level 
(2) 
(1) in per cent of (2) 
Uruguay  1981 8 32 25% 
Kenya  1985 12 28 43% 
Colombia  1998 6 20 30% 
Norway  1987 7 16 44% 
Finland  1991 2 15 13% 
Argentine  2001 4 13 31% 
Hongkong  1997 5 13 38% 
Philippines  1997 5 13 38% 
Spain  1977 8 13 62% 
Thailand  1997 3 13 23% 
Indonesie  1997 6 12 50% 
Sweden  1991 3 12 25% 
Brazil  1994 3 8 38% 
Malaysia  1997 4 8 50% 
Japan 1992 3 7 43% 
Hungary  1991 3 6 50% 
Mexico  1995 2 3 67% 
Turkey  1982 3 3       100% 
Source: see the data appendix 
 
4 Beyond Individual Crises 
Consider the exceptional, truly global nature of the crisis (the fact that most 
countries experience reduced import demand at the same time) and the strong 
(and in recent history unprecedented) collapse of the world trade volume that 
is illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 2 summarizes long term data for real world 
trade. The left axis presents index numbers (1998=100, logarithmic 
transformation) and the right axis summarizes a well-known measure of 
openness namely the trade-to-GDP ratio (in percent). Like in the 1930s a 
strong break from the long term trend in global trade volumes occurs. 
Moreover, a sharp reduction in the extent of openness is to be expected on the 
basis of present prognoses of the IMF (2009) for world GDP and the world 
trade volume. 
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FIGURE 2 
 Historical Perspective on the 2009 Trade Crunch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Real trade data 1880-1992 and trade to GDP ratios 1880-1998 Maddison 1998  
and 2001. Real trade data 1992-2009QI CPB trade monitor. Trade to GDP-ratios 2009  
and 2010 constructed on the basis of International Monetary Fund, World Economic  
Outlook Database, April 2009 
 
The collapse of global trade provides corroborative evidence that the present 
crisis is a different class: unlike was the case for the individual financial crises 
studied so far, we now have to realize that global markets are influenced 
through the concurrence of problems in all countries. This makes it impossible 
to follow an export led recovery strategy and for this reason the duration of the 
crisis may take much longer than during earlier post Second World War 
episodes. 
Let us thus consider the issue of duration from a broader historical 
perspective. By way of comparison three regional averages for the Great 
Depression have also been included in Figure 1 (these observations were not 
used in the calculations of depth and duration that were reported earlier). 
Compared to the individual post 1980 crises the percentage trade reduction 
during the inter bellum is not extraordinary. The findings in this paper may 
thus change the dominant historical perspective on the causes of the trade 
collapse during the Great Depression.3 Typically economists tend to blame 
protectionism and competitive devaluations for the reductions in trade 
volumes and for good reasons, but the findings in this paper suggest that 
                                                 
3 Eichengreen and Irwin (2009) in a recent article relate the trade collapse in the 1930s 
to the financial crisis rather than to special interest commercial policies. 
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another mechanism (namely the credit crunch) may have been empirically 
relevant too.  
The key difference, however, between the individual financial crises and 
the inter bellum appears to occur in the duration of the import crunch as 
import volumes for the industrialized countries, Asia and Latin America 
decreased over a period of 4 years. (Recovery to pre-crisis levels took some 8 
years but for many countries trade volumes did not fully recover before the 
Second World War).  
It is of course not clear beforehand what the experiences of the trade 
collapse during the Great Depression mean in the present context. Trade in the 
inter bellum was much more in conformity with the neoclassical model of 
comparative advantage whereas intra industry trade is an increasingly important 
characteristic of modern trade even in a North-South and South-South 
context. Much trade is intra company trade that takes place within 
multinational corporations that manage international value chains taking 
advantage of location advantages around the globe. As these intra-company 
trade flows would not seem to depend on trade credits the impact of a global 
financial crisis could be less in the present context  On the other hand, like in 
the inter bellum, consumer durables appear to be especially hit. Since 
producers of these durables, such as the automotive industry, are very much 
organized along international value chains demand reductions in one country 
may spread much more quickly to other countries through the trade channel. 
On balance it would seem sensible to consider the average duration indicated 
in the previous section as a minimum estimate. Actually this is a cautious note 
that would seem to apply to other analyses that use historical data to 
guesstimate the duration of the present crisis. 
 
5 Economic and Non-Economic Second Order Effects  
The findings in this paper show for individual cases that a financial crisis exerts 
a strong and negative impact on the volume of imports. The concurrence of 
financial crises in a great many countries implies that global import demand 
will contract so that an export led recovery is hardly conceivable. Therefore the 
average duration of the financial crises that have been studied in this paper 
probably offers a lower bound estimate for the duration of the present trade 
collapse. 
In addition it may be relevant to consider some second order effects that 
go beyond and/or are implied by the presently observed reduction in trade. 
First, the reduction of multilateral trade openness (that is exports and imports 
in per cent of GDP) will exert a further negative impact on growth. Lewer and 
van den Berg analyse 246 cross-section regressions and 596 time series 
regressions that were reported in 83 econometric studies that were published in 
scientific journals over the years 1960–2002. On the basis of the point 
estimates the studies yield a consensus view that a 1 percentage point reduction 
in multilateral trade linkage on average decreases annual long-run growth by 
0.2 percentage points. Lower multilateral trade openness will thus further 
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reduce the scope for recovery.4 Second, the reduction of the export potential 
could induce economic nationalism, protectionism and a flight into import 
substitution activities which will reduce global efficiency and export 
opportunities for other countries. Third, even without concrete and observable 
trade conflicts the implied uncertainty about trading possibilities will influence 
the extent of specialization and possibly the pattern of specialization as well 
(van Bergeijk, 2009).  
Importantly, non-economic second round effects may occur in the field 
of international politics. A rich empirical literature exists of studies that deal 
with the trade–conflict relationship (that is: how does international trade 
influence conflict and co-operation between nations) and the conflict–trade 
relationship (that is the questions of how conflicts hinder international trade or 
how the reduction of conflict increases trade). Although the causality issue has 
not been settled, little dispute exists about the significantly negative relation 
between the two variables (it has to be noted that the strength of the estimated 
effect tends to be lower in more recent datasets).  
TABLE 3 
 Meta-analysis of 15 empirical studies published in the years 1980-2006 on the trade 
conflict nexus (dependent variable: reported trade conflict elasticity, method: OLS) 
Publication lag (years) a -0.03* 
(-1.92) 
Dataset pre 1980 -0.25* 
(-2.11) 
Assumed causality (dummy) b  0.11 
(1.78) 
Terrorism 0.27$ 
(3.04) 
R2 0,59 
F test 3.6# 
 
Sources: Bergeijk (1989, 1994), Blomberg (2006), Freytag et al. (2006), Gasiorowski (1986),  Li et al. 
2004, Lundborg (1988), Mousseau et al. (2003), Nitsch et al. 2004, Polacheck (1980, 1992), 
Polacheck et al. 1992,  Pollins (1989), Summary (1989)  
Notes:  a year of publication minus last year of estimation period 
b (dummy = 0 for impact of conflict on trade)  
$ significant at 99%  
# significant at 95% 
* significant at 90% 
(t value-s in brackets)  
The constant term is negative and significant but not reported 
 
                                                 
4 See, however, Rodrik (2009) for a contrary position. Rodrik finds a small negative 
coefficient for the export share in his growth regressions. My point would be that 
Rodrik neglects another component of international trade, namely imports. 
 14
This is illustrated in Table 3 that reports on a meta-analysis of 15 scientific 
studies that were published in the years 1980-2006. On average these studies 
report an elasticity of -0.22. Almost sixty percent of the variation of the 
estimated coefficients can be explained by a simple regression. It matters 
whether the dataset is less recent (either from the perspective of the time lapse 
between the end-year of the data set and the year of publication or in the sense 
that the study deals only with periods prior to 1980) as the relationship appears 
weaker for the more recent past. Also the particular form of conflict matters: 
studies that deal with terrorism find a smaller effect. The assumed causality is 
not a significant determinant of the reported elasticity so that the studies agree 
on the strength of the mechanism although they disagree on the causality. All 
in all an increase in the level of international conflict could result in relation to 
the trade collapse. 
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
The trade collapse is thus not only relevant because of its economic 
implications. The phenomenon of de-globalisation (that is also influencing 
other flows such as Foreign Direct Investment, lending, development aid and 
migration) also threatens (the institution that underpin) the Liberal Peace. 
First-best government action should be aimed at reducing uncertainty per 
se, through, strict adherence to WTO conflict settlement procedures or other 
multilateral instruments that aim at increasing trust in free trade. Indeed, it is 
important to recall that the benefits of the Bretton Woods institutions were 
hoped to extend beyond economic stabilization and prevention of the errors of 
the Great Depression. The spirit of Bretton Woods was also to prevent a 
repetition of the great wars. Recent empirical research for the years 1885–1992 
shows that a clear contribution was delivered: 
The pacific benefits of democracy, economic interdependence, and international 
organizations are all the more apparent if they are compared to the effects of 
alliances and a preponderance of power – the elements stressed in realist theories 
of international politics. Surprisingly, alliances do not reduce the likelihood of 
interstate disputes, even fatal ones, when the influences of (democracy, economic 
interdependence and membership of international organizations) and previous 
dyadic conflicts are held constant. … Efforts to consolidate democracy, increase 
interdependence, and create a network of international organizations, our results 
suggest, should have greater benefits (…that) policymakers should incorporate in 
their strategy for peace. (Oneal et al 2003, p. 388) 
It is thus worth repeating that the multilateral governance of the world trade 
system is offering protection of small and medium-sized countries and new 
entrants to the world market. It is the multilateral approach that offers a first 
line of defence against increasing bilateralism and protectionism and against 
power politics of other countries. It provides the institutional and economic 
background against which trade, investment, and conflict resolution can be 
reconciled. 
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Appendix: Time Series Data Sources 
• Index numbers for the import volume could be derived from IMF, 
International Financial Statistics for  
o Argentine (2001) 
o Hongkong (1997) 
o Japan (1992) 
o Norway (1987) 
o Philippines (1997) 
o Sweden (1991) 
o Thailand (1997) 
o Turkey (1982) 
• Imports in constant prices could be derived from IMF, International Financial 
Statistics for  
o Brazil (1994) 
o Hungary (1991) 
• Imports in current prices deflated by GDP deflator could be derived from 
IMF, International Financial Statistics for  
o Colombia (1998) 
o Indonesia (1997) 
o Malaysia (1997) 
o Mexico (1995) 
o Spain (1977) 
o Uruguay (1981) 
• Seasonally adjusted index number for the volume imports could be derived 
from OECD Quarterly National Accounts for 
o Finland (1991) 
• Regional averages were taken from Maddison, 1985 
o Asia (1929): Table 2, p. 14 
o Industrialized countries (1929): Table 1, p. 13. 
o Latin America (1929): Table 2, p. 14 
• Data on Kenya (1985) are derived from Fingerand and Schuknecht, 1999, p. 
42. 
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